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Judicial Modesty in the Wartime
Context, Roosevelt v. Meyer (1863)

DAWINDER S. SIDHU

“The most important thing we do is not
doing,” Justice Louis D. Brandeis noted of the
Supreme Court.1 At the height of the Civil
War, the Supreme Court in Roosevelt v.
Meyer2 claimed that it could not review, and
therefore let stand, a state court decision
upholding the Legal Tender Act (“Act”),3 a
critical wartime measure designed to stabilize
the Union economy and fund the Union’s war
efforts. In this essay, I suggest that this oft‐
overlooked case warrants the legal community’s consideration because it implicates a
question fundamental to our constitutional
system: should the courts decline judicial
review—or, “not do”—in order to facilitate
government responses to wartime challenges?

The Legal Tender Act
In the process of establishing “one great,
respectable, and ﬂourishing empire,”4 the
Framers anticipated the possibility that the
United States would split into two distinct
political bodies, and that this disunion would

occur speciﬁcally along northern and southern
lines.5 One generation later, the prospect of
this North‐South division was altogether real.
In his March 4, 1861 inaugural address,
Abraham Lincoln acknowledged that the
common ties among the North and South
were bending, but urged the people not to
“break our bonds of affection.”6 During the
seminal speech, President Lincoln pledged to
keep the peace, provided that the North was
not subject to Southern provocation or
aggression. There shall be “no bloodshed or
violence, and there shall be none,” he
declared, “unless it be forced upon the
national authority.”7 Soon thereafter, on
April 12, 1861, confederates bombarded
Fort Sumter, ﬁring the opening salvo and
thereby triggering the condition in President
Lincoln’s inaugural. The “one great” nation
was at war with itself.
To sustain the war effort, the Union had
to withstand wartime stresses on the economy. “Wars have now become rather wars of
the purse than of the sword,” observed Chief
Justice Oliver Ellsworth as early as 1788.8 To
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the extent that war poses both ﬁnancial and
existential threats to a nation, the Union’s
initial ﬁnancial situation was precarious and
thus its ability to respond to the rebellion
seriously compromised.
On one side of the ledger, the Union’s
wartime costs were growing at a rapid clip. On
April 15, 1861, President Lincoln activated
the militia, charging it with the awesome
responsibility to “maintain the honor, the
integrity, and the existence of our National
Union[.]”9 President Lincoln made additional
calls for troops that year, leading to a dramatic
expansion of the Union army from 16,402
soldiers on January 1, 1861 to 575,917
soldiers by the end of the year. These and
other wartime preparations and necessaries
were quite costly. Indeed, federal expenditures ballooned from $63.1 million in 1860 to
$474.8 million in 1862. By January of 1862,
war costs approached $2 million per day.
On the other side, federal revenues
stagnated. For example, most federal revenue
came from customs duties, and income from
this source increased only slightly from $39.6
million in 1861 to $49.1 million in 1862. The
federal income tax was not implemented until
1862,10 and the meager revenues from
customs duties and other taxes could not
even cover the interest on the federal debt.11
The federal government could not rest its
wartime funding on borrowing because the
federal government was considered a poor
credit risk. Put simply by Charles Fairman, the
“treasury was empty” and the “Government’s
credit had been shattered.”12 The combination
of weak revenues and rising costs conspired to
bloat the federal debt, which swelled from $75
million in 1861 to $505 million the following
year.
In response to this acute, unsustainable
situation, the federal government was compelled to experiment with various economic
initiatives. Most notably, it introduced paper
notes as currency. At the onset of the Civil
War, regular exchange took place through the
use of specie (i.e., gold or silver coin, also

191

called “hard money”) rather than paper
money. In July of 1861, Congress authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P.
Chase, to issue “demand notes,” paper notes
redeemable on demand for specie.13 Banks
were not fond of these notes because they bore
no interest and depleted the banks’ reserves of
specie, an established and widely recognized
commodity. Congress also authorized Secretary Chase to offer banks “treasury notes”—
which paid 7.3% interest semiannually and
which were redeemable in three years—in
exchange for $50 million in specie.14 In
August of 1861, the banks agreed, supplying
the federal government with $50 million in
specie in return for $50 million in “treasury
notes,” making the same deal in October of
1861 and again in December. These programs
held promise, but were viable only insofar as
specie was readily available and ﬂowing
between banks, the people, and the government. The ﬂood of notes in the market gave
rise to inﬂation and, with a premium on
specie, the public and banks began hoarding
hard money. On December 28, 1861, banks
ultimately voted to suspend specie payments.
As the Supreme Court would hold in a
later ruling: “It was at such a time and in such
circumstances that Congress was called upon
to devise means for maintaining the army and
navy, for securing the large supplies of money
needed, and, indeed, for the preservation of the
government created by the Constitution. It was
at such a time and in such an emergency” that
Congress proposed the Legal Tender Act.15
On December 30, 1861, two days after
the banks’ decision to suspend specie payments, Elbridge Gerry Spaulding, chair of a
House Committee of Ways and Means
subcommittee, addressed his congressional
colleagues, announcing that the nation was
“never in greater peril than at this moment.”16
Congressman Spaulding introduced what he
called a “war measure” and a “measure of
necessity”17: a bill that would authorize
Secretary Chase to issue $150 million in
paper notes as “lawful money and a legal
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As Secretary of the Treasury during the Civil War, Salmon P. Chase reluctantly endorsed soft money. After Congress
passed the Legal Tender Act, he became responsible for approving the design of the United States Notes, and
included his own face on the front of the one‐dollar notes.

tender in payment of all debts, public and
private, within the United States.”18 Whereas
demand notes and treasury notes were backed
by specie, the United States Notes were
backed by the “good faith of the
government.”19
Congressman Spaulding explained that
the “leading object” of the bill was to “fund
the debt” and to “meet the most pressing
demands upon the treasury to sustain the army
and navy until they can make a vigorous
advance upon the traitors and crush out the
rebellion.”20 “These are extraordinary times
and extraordinary measures must be resorted
to, in order to save our Government,” he
continued.21 Secretary Chase, a general
proponent of hard money, reluctantly endorsed soft money, acknowledging that the
situation had become “indispensably necessary that we should resort to the issue of
United States notes.”22 As a sign of his
acquiescence—and perhaps even more so his
vanity—Secretary Chase, who was responsible for approving the design of the United
States Notes as the head of the Treasury,
included his own face on the front of the one‐
dollar notes, which would have the widest
circulation.23
On February 5, 1862, after two weeks of
debate, the House passed the legal tender bill
by a vote of 93–59, and on February 12, the

Senate did the same, by a 30–7 margin.
President Lincoln signed the Act into law on
February 25, 1862. Congress wasted no time,
quickly using the Act’s grant of power to
authorize the issuance of $150 million in
United States Notes. (By separately enacted
statutes, Congress authorized $150 million in
additional notes in July of 1862, and another
$150 million in March of 1863). The notes,
which would be printed with green ink, would
come to be called “greenbacks.”
The paper money issued pursuant to the
Act eased the ﬁnancial strain on the Union
economy and facilitated the war effort. As
Justice Samuel F. Miller later recounted,
thanks to the Act, Union soldiers in the ﬁeld
were compensated, public and private debts
were paid, trade was stimulated, and conﬁdence in the market was enhanced.24 Were it
not for the Act, he wrote, “the rebellion would
have triumphed, the States would have been
left divided, and the people impoverished.”25
In short, Justice Miller concluded, “The
National government would have perished,
and, with it, the Constitution.”26

The Constitutionality of the Act
The practical beneﬁts of the Act may
have been beyond dispute, but the
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constitutionality of the Act was a completely
separate—and very much open—question.
For example, the Attorney General, Edward
Bates, gave his opinion that the Act was
constitutional, but tempered that opinion with
the admission that it was prepared during the
“very brief interval afforded” and “with all the
brevity and without argument, for the time
does not allow elaborate consideration.”27
When the Act was under consideration,
some members of Congress held concerns that
the body did not have the authority under the
Constitution to establish paper notes as legal
tender. They argued that the Constitution
prohibits states from making “any Thing but
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts” and therefore the constitutional authority to issue paper notes is expressly denied
to states, but neither is it afﬁrmatively granted
to Congress.28 At most, they asserted, the
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Constitution gives Congress the power to
“coin money,” but it does not confer upon
Congress any authority to make paper
money.29 This point was advanced by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. “an express grant
seems to exclude implications,” and therefore,
“If the Constitution says expressly that
Congress shall have power to make metallic
legal tender, how can it be taken to say by
implication that Congress shall have power to
make paper legal tender?”30 Justice Stephen J.
Field stated the same proposition this way:
“When the Constitution says that Congress
shall have the power to make metallic coins a
legal tender, it declares in effect that it shall
make nothing else such tender. The afﬁrmative grant is here a negative of all other power
over the subject.”31 Moreover, there was fear
that paper currency would “unconstitutionally
impair contracts made in specie.”32

James Roosevelt’s business interests were primarily in coal and transportation, but he also served as president of the
Southern Railway Security Company. He is pictured here with his son, future President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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Accordingly, some, such as editors of the New
York World, deemed the Act “repugnant to
the Constitution.”33
In support of the Act’s constitutionality,
Congressman Spaulding, who became known
as the “father of the greenbacks,”34 asserted
that the Constitution’s own terms empowered
Congress to “raise and support armies” and
“provide and maintain a navy,” and that
Congress therefore retained “discretion” to
determine how to fund the army and navy,
including through the issuance of paper
notes.35 This authority, supplemented by the
enumerated power to make laws “necessary
and proper” to execute other express
powers,36 afforded Congress a sufﬁcient
constitutional foundation to pass the Act, he
said. Others, such as James Thayer of Harvard
Law School, posited that, while the Constitution gives Congress the authority to “coin

Justice James Moore Wayne of Georgia wrote the Court’s
brief opinion in Roosevelt v. Meyer, holding that
Roosevelt merely referenced the Constitution in support
of his essential claim that Congress did not have the
authority to pass the Legal Tender Act, and that the
plaintiff did not make an independent claim that his
constitutional rights were violated.

money,” the text of the Constitution says
nothing about “legal tender.”37 “The argument, then, that the express grant of power to
make coin a tender excludes the implication of
a power to make anything else a tender, is
inapplicable to the actual text of the Constitution,” Thayer wrote.38 There also was the
fallback “war powers” argument, espoused by
Republicans, that the “Constitution authorized any Congressionally approved measures
designed to maintain the government in times
of insurrection.”39

Roosevelt v. Meyer
The Supreme Court’s ﬁrst opportunity to
resolve the constitutionality of the Act arose
out of a case involving a simple debt. On
August 23, 1854, James J. Roosevelt—the
father of future President Franklin D. Roosevelt—loaned $8,000 to Samuel Bowne. As
security for the loan, Bowne executed a bond
and, along with his wife, placed a lien on their
property in New York. On May 28, 1861, the
property was conveyed to Lewis H. Meyer,
who assumed the obligation to Roosevelt. On
June 11, 1862, subsequent to the passage of
the Act, Meyer sought to discharge the debt to
Roosevelt by paying the principal and interest
in United States Notes. Roosevelt refused the
notes, insisting instead that payment be made
in gold coin. Roosevelt pointed out that the
proffered notes held a market value $326.78
less than gold coin. Further, Roosevelt argued,
Congress did not have the constitutional
power to authorize the issuance of ﬁat money.
On June 25, 1862, the parties, in
agreement as to the facts, submitted the
following question to the Supreme Court of
New York: were the paper notes of the Act
valid legal tender? In November of 1862, the
court heard arguments over two days and, on
June 3, 1863, ruled in favor of Roosevelt. The
next day, Meyer ﬁled notice that he would
appeal the adverse decision to New York’s
highest court, the Court of Appeals of New
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York. On September 29, 1863, the Court of
Appeals of New York entertained arguments
in the case. On October 9, 1863, the court
reversed, siding with Meyer. The court
ordered Roosevelt to accept the paper notes
as full and complete satisfaction of the debt,
and to discharge the bond and mortgage.
On December 11, 1863, Roosevelt
appealed, ﬁling, pursuant to the Section 25
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, a writ of error to
the Supreme Court of the United States,
arguing that a “manifest error hath happened
to [his] great damage” and urging that “such
error . . . should be duly corrected” by the
Court.40 The same day, Meyer moved to
dismiss the writ for lack of jurisdiction. Meyer
contended that Section 25 did not provide the
Supreme Court with authority to review a
decision by a state’s court of last resort that
upholds a federal statute.41 The ﬁrst subsection of Section 25 provides that the Supreme
Court may review the ﬁnal decision of “the
highest court of law or equity of a State” in
which “the validity of a treaty or statute” is put
into question and the “decision is against their
validity[.]”42 Here, the Supreme Court could
not hear the appeal, Meyer claimed, because
the Court of Appeals of New York was New
York’s highest court and the court did not rule
“against” the validity of the Act.43
In response, Roosevelt highlighted the
third subsection of Section 25 as the source of
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. This passage authorizes the Court to review a decision
by a state’s court of last resort that construes
“any clause of the constitution” against a
“right” of either party.44 Here, Roosevelt
argued principally that the proffered payment
in United States Notes was $326.78 short,
thus the Court of Appeals of New York’s
decision forcing him to accept such payment
deprived him of property without due process
of law in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights. Therefore, according to Roosevelt, the
decision by New York’s highest court was
“against” his rights and the Supreme Court
could hear his challenge to the Act.
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In the Judiciary Act of 1863, Congress,
which has the constitutional power to establish inferior federal courts,45 created a tenth
circuit.46 The addition of this new circuit
required that the number of Justices increase
from nine to ten. By the time Roosevelt’s
appeal was before the Court, the Bench had
the following ten members: Roger B. Taney
of Maryland (Chief Justice), James Moore
Wayne of Georgia, John Catron of Tennessee,
Samuel Nelson of New York, Robert C. Grier
of Pennsylvania, Nathan Clifford of Maine,
Noah Haynes Swayne of Ohio, Samuel F.
Miller of Iowa, David Davis of Illinois, and
Stephen J. Field of California.
On December 21, 1863, three days after it
heard oral argument, the Court agreed with
Meyer’s interpretation of subsection one of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, holding that it did
not have jurisdiction to consider Roosevelt’s
appeal.47 The brief opinion, written by Justice
Wayne, dismissed Roosevelt’s arguments as
to the viability of subsection three, suggesting
that Roosevelt merely referenced the Constitution in support of his essential claim that
Congress did not have the authority to pass the
Act, and that Roosevelt did not make an
independent claim that his constitutional
rights were violated.48 In staying its hand,
the Court left intact the ruling by the New
York Court of Appeals on the constitutionality of the paper notes.
Justice Nelson dissented without writing
separately. Chief Justice Taney, who was ill
and did not participate in the case, also penned
an undelivered dissent.

Judicial Modesty and Roosevelt
What can we make of Roosevelt?
Whereas judicial activism and judicial restraint are unhelpful terms insofar as they are
designed to characterize virtuous judicial
decision making, the concept of judicial
modesty may be useful at least as one measure
of principled judicial review. Judicial
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modesty generally occurs when a judge
subordinates his or her personal policy
preferences in service of and in allegiance
to broader constitutional norms that contradict
those personally held preferences.49
The legal tender context offers an
example of judicial modesty. In 1870, the
Supreme Court in Hepburn v. Griswold held
that the Constitution vested no power in
Congress to render paper money legal tender
for preexisting debt obligations.50 Hepburn
was authored by Salmon P. Chase, the former
Treasury Secretary who joined the Supreme
Court as Chief Justice of the United States in
1864. In other words, Chief Justice Chase
asserted that the very Act that he endorsed,
albeit reluctantly, as the Treasury Secretary
was unconstitutional. In turning down the
opportunity to afﬁrm a policy position in a
judicial forum, Chief Justice Chase reﬂected
the sort of forbearance that is central to
judicial modesty.
On initial inspection, Roosevelt may be
said to embody three aspects of judicial
modesty. First, the Roosevelt Court declined
jurisdiction, and in doing so ruled only that it
lacked the authority to hear the case. In
general, refusing to hear a case on jurisdictional grounds may be considered judicial
modesty because the refusal demonstrates a
court’s ability to constrain its vast and natural
adjudicative functions51 in deference to
structural constitutional considerations. Rather than give effect to personal or policy
preferences, the argument would go, the
Roosevelt Court recognized and paid tribute
to its limits in our constitutional design.
Second, some also may credit the
Roosevelt Court with exhibiting judicial
modesty in that the Court declined to overturn
a critical wartime statute. To some, national
security matters are incapable of meaningful
judicial appraisal and courts are therefore ill‐
equipped to second‐guess the national security
initiatives devised by the policy making
branches.52 Further, they may say, courts
should not let the technical niceties of the law

impair that which may be necessary to help the
government respond to existential threats.
This position calls to mind Senator William
Pitt Fessenden’s take on the Act: “the thing is
wrong in itself but to leave the government
without resources at such a crisis is not to be
thought of.”53 The Roosevelt Court may
be said to embody judicial modesty because
the decision reﬂects the Court’s self‐awareness
of judicial inadequacy in the national security
context as well as the court’s appreciation for
the Union’s ﬁrst‐order interest in self‐
preservation.
Third, the appearance of judicial modesty
also may arise from the view that the
Roosevelt Court, which consisted of seven
Democrats and three Republicans, would be
disinclined to uphold an Act passed by a
Republican administration. From this perspective, Roosevelt was an act of judicial
modesty because the majority suppressed its
political preferences in refusing to strike down
an Act championed by the party opposite.
Despite these three arguments, any clear
sense that Roosevelt was an exercise of
judicial modesty becomes cloudy in light of
a few additional considerations. First, the
force of the contention that Roosevelt involved judicial modesty because of the
political afﬁliations of the Justices loses steam
when one realizes that, as Akhil Amar writes
of the Court in 1863, “the deepest ideological
divide ran not between Republicans and
Democrats but between Unionists and Secessionists.”54 The Roosevelt Court was dominated by Unionists. For example, in 1862, the
same Court (minus Justice Field, who had not
yet been appointed) held in The Prize Cases
that President Lincoln’s order of a military
blockade in several Southern states was
constitutional, even though Congress had
not formally declared war.55 This decision,
historian Brian McGinty explains, indicated
that the Court in 1862 was “prepared to
sustain the government’s war efforts” and
“prepared to ‘stretch’ constitutional doctrine
to meet the extraordinary exigencies of the
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crisis[.]”56 That this crisis was more acute in
December of 1863 suggests that the Roosevelt
Court likely possessed an even greater
willingness to let stand the Union’s wartime
actions. This increased support for the Union
may be reﬂected in the votes in the two cases
—5–4 in The Prize Cases and 8–1 in
Roosevelt. In short, the Court may not have
subordinated its political interests in Roosevelt, but instead may have actively effectuated
those preferences towards the Union by
leaving the Act undisturbed.
The Unionist character of the Court and
the potential for party identiﬁcation to mislead
an analysis of Roosevelt are reinforced by the
selection of Justice Field. In picking the tenth
Justice to serve on the Bench, President
Lincoln, a Republican, made the seemingly
unusual move of nominating Justice Field, a
Democrat. This choice is perhaps puzzling
from a Republican/Democrat framework, but
is imminently reasonable when one realizes
that Justice Field was a staunch Unionist.
With respect to the notion that the
Roosevelt Court exhibited judicial modesty
because it merely disclaimed jurisdiction, the
wartime circumstances surrounding Roosevelt
suggest that the jurisdictional ruling may have
been strategic. David Silver, a scholar of
constitutional issues during the Civil War,
observes that “the majority of the Court did
not desire to interfere with a measure devised
by the administration to aid the war effort.”57
As a result, Silver notes, the Roosevelt Court
narrowly interpreted its appellate jurisdiction
and “gracefully side‐stepped the broad issues
involved.”58 Had the Roosevelt Court “not
denied jurisdiction on dubious statutory
grounds,” writes Mark A. Graber, the Court
“would have almost certainly declared the
[Act] unconstitutional.”59 Seen from this light,
Roosevelt may have been a “judicial dodge,”60
more than a detached procedural ruling.
Subsequent post‐war decisions cut in
favor of this perspective. In 1871, with the war
over and wartime stresses eased, the Court
explicitly overruled Roosevelt, conceding that
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it was wrongly decided and that the Court’s
jurisdiction could have been sustained just as
Roosevelt had argued in 1863.61 The ability
of the Court to recognize the propriety of
Roosevelt’s appellate jurisdiction argument
in the calmness of peace suggests that
wartime circumstances may account for the
Roosevelt Court’s “dubious” procedural decision.62 (In 1871, the Court, with new
members nominated the same day as—and
arguably in response to63—Hepburn, found
the Act constitutional.)64
To be sure, the Roosevelt Court may not
have had much occasion to construe the
subsection of the Judiciary Act of 1789 relied
on by Roosevelt. Fairman suspects that the
Court may have merely invoked subsection
one out of “habit” and that Roosevelt’s
subsection three argument was a “novelty”
that “caught the Justices unawares.”65 But this
generous explanation is tough to square with
the fact that Roosevelt expressly and plainly
articulated in his brief why subsection three
provided a foundation for the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, and likely said the same at
argument. One is hard‐pressed to believe that
the Court would dismiss jurisdiction in rote,
automatic fashion when faced with contrary
text and argument.
The Roosevelt Court arguably engaged in
strategic inaction in another wartime case,
adding further weight to the possibility of a
calculated procedural ruling in Roosevelt. In
1864, during the war, the Court in Ex Parte
Vallandigham unanimously held that it did
not have jurisdiction to consider a challenge to
a military commission.66 In 1866, after the
war was over, however, the Court in Ex Parte
Milligan proceeded to the merits and held that
military commissions could not be applied to
a citizen where the civilian courts were
open.67 In Roosevelt, as with Vallandigham,
the Court in wartime perhaps utilized a
jurisdictional bypass as a means to secure a
desired substantive outcome that was seen to
be incorrect after the war, as in Hepburn and
Milligan, respectively.
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The ﬁnal argument that Roosevelt constitutes judicial modesty stems from the
proposition that the Court deferred to the
political branches’ national security efforts. But
the Roosevelt Court did not expressly invoke a
rule of necessity in its opinion. Accordingly, on
this score, the virtues of judicial forbearance
cannot be attributed to Roosevelt. In sum, to the
extent that judicial modesty is a touchstone for
proper judicial behavior, Roosevelt leaves
much to be desired from a legal lens, its
wartime beneﬁts notwithstanding.


Roosevelt triggers the critically important
question of whether the courts should afﬁrmatively aid the national security policies of
Congress and/or the Executive by declining
jurisdiction. In general, ideas on principled
judicial decision making in the wartime
context seem to gravitate towards two poles.
On one end is the notion that the laws are
silent, or at least “speak with a somewhat
different voice,” in times of war.68 The
Constitution is “not a suicide pact,” the
Supreme Court has famously remarked.69
On the other end is the proposition that times
of war demand even more robust judicial
vigilance of government measures that may
curtail individual rights and liberties.70 Experiences with excessive judicial deference to
the other branches, such as in Korematsu v.
United States,71 may serve as useful reminders of the hazards of “not doing” in the
wartime context, and may caution the courts
to be particularly on guard when the government is implementing national security policies affecting personal freedoms.
The American people and their leaders
remain engaged in an ongoing conversation
regarding which of the spectrum, or something in between, marks the acceptable role
for the courts in times of war.72 In analyzing
Roosevelt, I suggest that at least one option
should be taken off the table: the opportunistic
use of jurisdictional principles to support the
war effort. It is one thing to engage in ﬂexible
judicial review in times of war, it is entirely

another to close the door to judicial review
altogether. This constitutional norm would
still leave plenty of room within the joints for
the people to ﬁne‐tune the extent to which
courts should review actions by the government in moments of crisis. In this respect, the
value of Roosevelt is that it may help us get
closer, however marginally, towards determining the proper role of the courts in
wartime.
Author’s Note: My thanks to Clare
Cushman, Michael Duggan, Clay Risen, and
Dr. Jaswinder Sidhu for helpful edits and
conversations, the staff of the Supreme Court
Library and Linda Baltrusch for their excellent research assistance, and the Board of
Editors of the Journal of Supreme Court
History for the opportunity to contribute to
this wonderful and important forum. This
essay is adapted from Dawinder S. Sidhu,
“The Birth of the Greenback,” The New York
Times, Dec. 31, 2013, available at: http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/31/
the‐birth‐of‐the‐greenback.
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